

STUDY MATERIAL FOR B.A.I. SEMESTER

SUBJECT: POLITICAL THEORY-DISCIPLINE SPECIFIC COURSE-I (CORE)

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UNIT-I

Political Theory

An Introduction:

The idea of Theory: Before I move to the meaning and significance of political theory, I want to clarify the concept of theory then I will move to theory in relation to social science and theory in relation to political science. The word, of course, is of Greek origin; and in the Greek language it belongs to a short vocabulary of five words which is worth considering:

Thea: something seen, a 'spectacle', a curious, striking or unusual sight, an occurrence.

Theorein: To look at, to observe what is going on.

Theoros: An intelligent observer; one who looks at what is going on, asks himself questions about it and tries to understand it.

Theoria: The act or procedure of seeking to understand what is going on: 'theorizing'.

Theorema: What may emerge from 'theorizing?' A conclusion reached by a *theoros*.
'An understanding' of what is going on, A 'theorem'.

Now let's elaborate these statements further,

- (1) The *thea*, the occurrence with which it starts, is not merely 'looked at'; it is 'perceived', 'noticed', 'attended to', 'identified', perhaps even named. The *thea* itself is the first account we give to ourselves of what is going on. It is already in some sense 'intelligible' or it could not and would not be 'noticed' and 'distinguished'. It is what we ordinarily call a 'fact'. Thus theorizing of any sort begins with something already understood in some degree.

- (2) Secondly, it is suggested that this *thea*, this 'fact', is not only understood, but a starting point for an activity of 'theorizing' supposing or speculating. And 'theorizing' takes place because the *theoros* is in some respect, or in some degree, dissatisfied with his first understanding of what is going on. A mystery, an unintelligibility remains which he wants to dispel "dispel doubts". He does not know in advance what the *thea* will look like when it has become entirely intelligible; all he knows is that it is not entirely intelligible as he at present stage. He has something to do understand it.
- (3) Thirdly, it is suggested that 'theorizing' is an effort to understand in a procedure of *enquiry*. That is to say, the *theoros* does not sit gazing at the occurrence merely wondering what is really going on; his urge to make it more intelligible stems from specific dissatisfactions with his present understanding. There is mystery still to be dispelled, and this mystery consists of specific questions which his present understanding leaves unanswered.
- (4) Fourthly, it is suggested that in any conclusion he may reach, his 'theorem' will be nothing more than an improved understanding of what was, from the beginning, in some degree understood. Thus, there is no absolute distinction between 'fact' and 'theorem'; both are conclusions, both are understandings of what is going on, but one is a more satisfying understanding than the other. And there is no absolute difference between *theorein* ('observing' what is going on) and 'theorizing' what is going on; both are reflective activities in which an understanding of what is going on is being sought. 'Theorizing', then, is being represented here as a continuous, unconditional activity of trying to understand. It begins with an occurrence which is both understood and waiting to be understood. It is making more sense out of what already has some sense. And its principle is: 'Never ask the end'. It will go on until the occurrence becomes transparent, until the last vestige of mystery has been dispelled, until the *theoros* runs out of questions.

To explain anything, we start with the assumption that there is a hidden system of relations which is discoverable and our explanation consists of discovering and articulating this system of relations. To predict an event we begin with knowledge of a system of relations and move on to a logical deduction of the consequence of this known system of relations. In the final analysis, we explain an event because we know how it is

related to other events and our explanation consists of the articulation of the relevant relations. We can predict an event only because we know how it is related to other events. If we explain an event, we simultaneously predict it that is we offer a definition of the circumstances under which the event occurs.

So basically theory building is kind of process involving conceptual understanding of an event or for that matter explanation and description of any occurrence or phenomena. Thus, theory is always designated to explain something both in scientific and nonscientific ways depending upon whether scientific are rules followed or not. In explaining phenomena a theory may refer to some general laws in the sense of regularity and finding a pattern in them. New theories often combine the references of old long established theories with some additional suggestions.

POLITICAL THEORY: MEANING AND ITS NATURE: WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY?

In simplest terms political theory means theory of politics or anything directly or indirectly relevant to politics or public life. It is a generalization of political events and it involves an attempt to explain, describe and prescribe the political phenomenon. A theorist may be regarded engaged in political philosophy if his aim is to lay down the rules for good conduct and behavior which states and citizens of the country 'ought' to follow. A theorist whose pursuit is political science is interested in describing and explaining the realities of political behavior. For a theorist worthy of the name plays a double role. He is partly scientist and partly philosopher. As a scientist he attempts to understand and explain the process of political events, their pattern and regularities and draw up generalized propositions about the actual relations between states and citizens and about the role of power in society. Not all efforts at description and explanation can lay claim to the status of science and there can be no such thing as pure description or an objective political science. The reality which is described is a selective one and author's basis for selection is ultimately philosophical. An individual's moral sense always gives shape to his perceptions and governs his interpretation of what he sees. So thinking and observing about your surroundings are the basic components of building a political theory, it also depends upon your methodology. Political thinkers do not ignore scientific methodology while putting forth their political philosophy. Aristotle is said to have adopted the comparative method of analyzing and classifying states of his times-he is said to have read and examined 158

constitutions of his times. Hobbes, and before him, Machiavelli too had followed the scientific methodology expressing their ideas. On the other hand Plato and Rousseau are primarily concerned to provide prescriptions for the rest of us to follow. What is important to bear in mind is that no theorist can make a lasting contribution to human knowledge unless he works in the realms of both science and philosophy. A good philosopher has always been well aware about his or her surrounding realities and it is here his or her philosophy begins.

There is no consensus among political theorists as to what, exactly, constitutes the discipline. When one surveys the journals in political theory and the books written by those who call themselves 'political theorists' one sees a variety of topics being addressed. These range from the history of political thought to analyses of political concepts like freedom, equality and democracy. Topics from such diverse traditions as feminism, socialism, anarchism and liberalism all fall under the general rubric of 'political theory'. The fact that political theory is thriving as a discipline makes it all the more difficult to provide an inclusive definition of the discipline. The areas of enquiry that political theorists explore are constantly changing, and with this, our understanding of what qualifies as political theory.

Scope and Nature of Political Theory: After discussing the meaning of political theory let's identify its nature and scope. Broadly speaking political theory denotes a systematic study of state, government and power. It not only tells us how state and government exercises power, who wields the actual power, it also evaluates the decisions and policies of state and government, reflects on political institutions and other activities falling within public sphere. Political theorist discusses and reflects on good society and lays down certain standards for political establishment to follow, aims at highest realization of political values, tells us how should we live a good life and how should we live together. Political theory is thus a *normative* discipline; it is primarily concerned with how things ought to be as opposed to how things actually are. Of course this does not mean that theorists should not take seriously the realities of the current social and political arrangements. This is essential as one cannot determine what we should be aspiring towards if one does not know where we currently are and thus what the pros and cons of the current arrangement are. But political theorists do not engage in the descriptive or explanatory project that the political scientist engages in. The political scientist tackles questions like How is a particular political system different from that of other countries? or Who *actually* wields political power in a political system? Whereas the political theorist will ask who *should* wield political

power in society and what ideals, principles and institutional arrangements best secure the diverse demands of justice? A diverse range of political arrangements can be, and have been, defended by reference to values such as justice, freedom, equality and democracy. The job of the political theorist is also to bring some precision to these vague and contested concepts so that one can provide convincing arguments for the particular social arrangements one believe we should be aspiring towards. Ideas are powerful things; they exert great influence on the real world and help determine the fate of the lives of billions of people. So the political theorist has a very important role to play, one that has an influence on the real world of politics. Broadly speaking, political theory may be classified into following categories:

1. Normative theory--"Ought" theory, normative theory involves questions of VALUE, of what we SHOULD do, or of what we OUGHT to do. This is the stuff of political philosophy, and as you know it is the oldest area of political study. Normative theory has had something of a renaissance with the post-behavioralist movement.
2. Empirical Theory--"Is" theory Empirical theory deals more with questions of what IS rather than what SHOULD be. This is the kind of theory used by behaviorist political scientists. Empirical theorists lay out hypotheses that can be tested by applying the scientific method. These hypotheses are generated by theories. The results of the tests lead to refinement of these theories.

"Fact" statements and "value" statements:-In theories and virtually every theory involves either fact statements or value statements or both-- usually both. The difference and relationship between these kinds of statements reflect the difference and relationship between normative and empirical theory.

Difference: Fact statements are those that can be observed as being true or not true using one of the five human senses. Another way of saying this is that fact statements can be tested scientifically. Empirical theory deals with these kinds of statements. They meet the test of intersubjective transmissibility. That is, they are tested through simple observations about which we can most likely agree. For example, we can agree that a meter registered at 14, or that the respondent said "yes" to the question, or that the senator voted in favor of the bill. We can use

one of our senses to observe what happened and what we observed is usually not subject to controversy.

On the other hand, value statements cannot be tested directly. Even though sensory observation might be used to determine which candidate or policy is "best," we are likely to disagree about the conclusion because of the values that get involved with what we see or hear. Normative theory deals mainly with value statements.

Let me give you some example of each and you see if you can tell the difference. **a.** Democratic nations are better to live in than nondemocratic nations. Now you probably all agree with this statement. Nevertheless, it is clearly a value statement in that it involves the speaker making a preference, a judgment that involves a great deal of interpretation. Exactly what do we mean by "better?" If by better health, then living in Castro's Cuba may be better than living in many places in the U.S. If we mean having political freedoms, then a different conclusion would be drawn. And what if people use democratic processes to reduce rights? Is Iraq a better nation if the people democratically choose to take the property rights that woman had under Saddam?

b. Democratic nations have higher per capita incomes than nondemocratic nations. All of you also probably agree with this one as well. However, it is a fact statement because it can be directly tested using the sense of sight in looking at generally accepted economic measures and generally accepted classifications of nations. The observations are intersubjectively transmissible. Now let me give you one example that may seem a little tricky. **c.** Most students on this campus feel that democracy is the best form of government. Be careful here! It sounds like the first statement in which there were values involved. Only this time it's not the values of the speaker, but rather the values of a group of individuals that she/he is speaking of, in this case students on this campus. Moreover, this time you can test the statement in ways that depend on the five senses and get results that are again inter subjectively transmissible. That is, people will be able to agree whether or not the statement is true based on the test and the test alone. We could simply do a survey of all students on the campus or even a reasonable sample of them and SEE if in FACT they do feel that democracy is the best form of government. We'll talk more about doing surveys and samples later on.

3. Relationships between values and facts in science, if you think about the three examples I just gave you, you may already see that a relationship exists between value statements and fact statements. We can often take a value statement that is not directly testable and approximate it

with a related fact statement that is testable. If by "better" we mean higher incomes, or less illiteracy, or more indoor bathrooms or whatever, we can do some observation and testing.

If you think about this a little more, you will realize that the next question is whether or not we can ever fully test and prove a value statement by testing all conceivably related fact statements. As you might guess, this is another question on which many disagree. I would tend to say that the answer is no, because no matter how many tests of "better" we might come up with, someone can think of another. It's kind of like the concept of mathematical infinity you keep trying, but you can never get there. You can always add one more. But while referring to the building blocks of political theory one should not lose sight of the various stages a particular theory passes through. So theory building process in political science involves a well focusing mind of political theorist whose pursuit is to describe and explain the realities of political behavior.

WHY WE NEED POLITICAL THEORY:

What are the functions of political theory? Do we need political theory and how it serves us in day today life? Political theory examines questions of these kinds and systematically thinks about the values that inform political life -liberty, freedom, justice, and equality. It explains the meaning and significance of these concepts relate them with the day to day events and experiences. After all, a central task of political philosophers as moral philosophers has been to provide yardsticks for public conduct, so essential in areas such as the distribution of scarce goods, or the wielding of power by political leaders and decision-makers. Societies rightly rely on political philosophers to point out ways of improving social institutions, for political ethics pertains to the instilling of virtuous public practices. A central purpose of political theory is to prescribe and to offer good solutions to problems of political organization and practices. Philosophers and ideologues agree on this end. Normative political theory involves three distinct enterprises, the study of values relevant to assessing the political arrangements, secondly, the study of the sorts of political arrangements that would be likely to choose when we enter into contract. The study of the sorts of arrangements that we expect to remain firmly in place, once put in place. The basic objective of political theory to train citizens to think rationally about political questions and assess the political events of our time. It analyses certain basic questions such as how society should be organized? Why do need Government? What is the best form of Government? Does Law limit our freedom? What does state owe to its citizens? What citizens

owe to state and other citizens? A political theorist addresses these questions and in a way shapes our understanding of constitutions and government working.

Political Science: Meaning, Nature and Scope,

INTRODUCTION: 1.1. MEANING;

The term 'Polity', 'politics' and 'political' are derived from the Greek word 'polis' , which denoted ancient Greek city-state. The Greek-states were relatively small states which were separated from each other by geographical barriers. Each city-state had evolved a compact social life and culture where institutions and activities were knit together to secure the objectives of good life. Such institutions help us find ways of living together acknowledging our obligations to each other. Among such institutions, governments play an important role. How governments are formed and how they function is thus an important focus of politics.

Since the actions of the governments affect us in many ways, is not confined to the affairs of government. We see a government affects the lives of people, decides our economic policies, foreign policy, educational policy, prioritizing issues facing by the citizens of the country. If the government is inefficient and allows any kind of leniency especially during turbulent times, economy, education, markets, health and life will disrupt. Thus the decisions of parliament in the form of legislations must be debated and discussed within the public forums examine their constitutional and public good spirit. In this regard, we negotiate; passionately debate the actions of government. Politics arises from these debates and discussions and what is just and desirable for us and our society is the hallmark of politics.

1.2. NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE;

Politics is an activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live. Politics have been understood differently by different political scientists and within different traditions. Politics has been viewed as the 'art of government' or as 'what concerns the state'; 'as the conduct and management of public affairs'; as the resolution of conflict through debate and discussion and sometimes compromise; as the production, distribution and management of scarce resources, a search for conflict resolution. As an academic discipline a variety of approaches has been adopted in the study of politics. These include philosophical approach, normative analysis approach, and historical approach. In the recent past, new modern approaches were applied to the study of political science like behavioral

approach, input-out approach, structural approach and Marxist approach. There has been a considerable debate about the scope and nature of political science. Traditionally, politics has narrowly been seen as an activity embracing institutions and actors operating in a 'public sphere' concerned with decisions one and all. However, now a day there is an increasing understanding of private sphere as well.

1.3. SCOPE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE;

Political Theorists since Aristotle (384-322) try to define the nature and scope of political science. For Aristotle man is basically a political animal and the fact that human beings fulfill their genuine needs only through a political community. For Aristotle, the political is important for it stands for a common political space in which all citizens participate. This notion resonates with Michael Joseph Oakeshott (1901-90) and Hannah Arendt (1906-75) who believe that political life is distinctive form of human organization with special value, a place for freedom, honour and full human development. Similar to this view was advocated by David Easton (1965) for whom politics is an authoritative allocation of values, elaboration on Harold Lasswell's famous phrase "who gets what, when and How?". The scope of political science can be further elaborated on the following points.

1. Politics as an art of government: Politics is not a science.... but an art. The art of government, the exercise of power and control, art of enforcing collective decision making process.
2. Politics as Public Affairs: Politics is a public activity, involves debate and discussion of public affairs.
3. Politics as Compromise and Consensus: Politics is an activity within which differing interests gets resolved and considered opinion is promoted among diverse interests.
4. Politics as exercise of power.
5. Study of the state: what state has been what it is and what it ought to be?
6. Study of political Institutions and ideas.

1.2. Politics as:

A) Art of government

'Politics is not a science . . . but an art', Chancellor Bismarck is reputed to have told the German *Reichstag* (Parliament building in Berlin). The art Bismarck had in mind was the art of government, the exercise of control within society through the making and enforcement of

collective decisions. This is perhaps the classical definition of politics, developed from the original meaning of the term in Ancient Greece. The word 'politics' is derived from polis, meaning literally 'city-state'. Ancient Greek society was divided into a collection of independent city-states, each of which possessed its own system of government. The largest and most influential of these city-states was Athens, often portrayed as the cradle of democratic government. In this light, politics can be understood to refer to the affairs of the *polis* – in effect, 'what concerns the polis'. The modern form of this definition is therefore 'what concerns the state.' This view of politics is clearly evident in the everyday use of the term: people are said to be 'in politics' when they hold public office, or to be 'entering politics' when they seek to do so. It is also a definition that academic political science has helped to perpetuate.

In many ways, the notion that politics amounts to 'what concerns the state' is the traditional view of the discipline, reflected in the tendency for academic study to focus on the personnel and machinery of government. To study politics is, in essence, to study government, or, more broadly, to study the exercise of authority. This view is advanced in the writings of the influential US political scientist David Easton (1979, 1981), who defined politics as the 'authoritative allocation of values'. By this, he meant that politics encompasses the various processes through which government responds to pressures from the larger society, in particular by allocating benefits, rewards or penalties. 'Authoritative values' are therefore those that are widely accepted in society, and are considered binding by the mass of citizens. In this view, politics is associated with 'policy' that is, with formal or authoritative decisions that establish a plan of action for the community.

However, what is striking about this definition is that it offers a highly restricted view of politics. Politics is what takes place within a polity, a system of social organization centered on the machinery of government. Politics is therefore practiced in cabinet rooms, legislative chambers, government departments and the like; and it is engaged in by a limited and specific group of people, notably politicians, civil servants and lobbyists. This means that most people, most institutions and most social activities can be regarded as being 'outside' politics. Businesses, schools and other educational institutions, community groups, families and so on are in this sense 'non-political', because they are not engaged in 'running the country'. By the same token, to portray politics as an essentially state-bound activity is to ignore the increasingly important international or global influences on modern life. This definition can, however, be

narrowed still further. This is evident in the tendency to treat politics as the equivalent of party politics. In other words, the realm of 'the political' is restricted to those state actors who are consciously motivated by ideological beliefs, and who seek to advance them through membership of a formal organization such as a political party. This is the sense in which politicians are described as 'political', whereas civil servants are seen as 'non-political', as long as, of course, they act in a neutral and professional fashion. Similarly, judges are taken to be 'non-political' figures while they interpret the law impartially and in accordance with the available evidence, but they may be accused of being 'political' if their judgment is influenced by personal preferences or some other form of bias. The link between politics and the affairs of the state also helps to explain why negative or pejorative images have so often been attached to politics. This is because, in the popular mind, politics is closely associated with the activities of politicians. Put brutally, politicians are often seen as power-seeking hypocrites who conceal personal ambition behind the rhetoric of public service and ideological conviction. Indeed, this perception has become more common in the modern period as intensified media exposure has more effectively brought to light examples of corruption and dishonesty, giving rise to the phenomenon of anti-politics. This rejection of the personnel and machinery of conventional political life is rooted in a view of politics as a self-serving, two-faced and unprincipled activity, clearly evident in the use of derogatory phrases such as 'office politics' and 'politicking'. Such an image of politics is sometimes traced back to the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, who, in *The Prince* ([1532] 1961), developed a strictly realistic account of politics that drew attention to the use by political leaders of cunning, cruelty and manipulation.

B) Politics as Power:

The fourth definition of politics is both the broadest and the most radical. Rather than confining politics to a particular sphere (the government, the state or the 'public' realm), this view sees politics at work in all social activities and in every corner of human existence. As Adrian Leftwich proclaimed in *what is Politics? The Activity and Its Study* (2004), 'politics is at the heart of *all* collective social activity, formal and informal, public and private, in *all* human groups, institutions and societies'. In this sense, politics takes place at every level of social interaction; it can be found within families and amongst small groups of friends just as much as amongst nations and on the global stage. However, what is it that is distinctive about political At its broadest, politics concerns the production, distribution and use of resources in the course of

social existence. Politics is, in essence, power: the ability to achieve a desired outcome, through whatever means. This notion was neatly summed up in the title of Harold Lasswell's book *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?* (1936). From this perspective, politics is about diversity and conflict, but the essential ingredient is the existence of scarcity: the simple fact that, while human needs and desires are infinite, the resources available to satisfy them are always limited. Politics can therefore be seen as a struggle over scarce resources, and power can be seen as the means through which this struggle is conducted. Advocates of the view of politics as power include feminists and Marxists. The rise of the women's liberation movement in the 1960s and 1970s, bringing with it a growing interest in feminism, stimulated more radical thinking about the nature of 'the political'. Not only have modern feminists sought to expand the arenas in which politics can be seen to take place, a notion most boldly asserted through the radical feminist slogan 'the personal is the political', but they have also tended to view politics as a process, specifically one related to the exercise of power over others. This view was summed by Kate Millett in *Sexual Politics* (1969), in which she defined politics as 'power-structured relationships, arrangements whereby one group of persons is controlled by another'. Marxists, for their part, have used the term 'politics' in two senses. On one level, Marx (see p. 41) used 'politics' in a conventional sense to refer to the apparatus of the state. In the *Communist Manifesto* ([1848] 1967), he (and Engels) thus referred to political power as 'merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another'. For Marx, politics, together with law and culture, are part of a 'superstructure' that is distinct from the economic 'base' that is the real foundation of social life. However, he did not see the economic 'base' and the legal and political 'superstructure' as entirely separate. He believed that the 'superstructure' arose out of, and reflected, the economic 'base'. At a deeper level, political power, in this view, is therefore rooted in the class system; as Lenin (see p. 99) put it, 'politics is the most concentrated form of economics'. As opposed to believing that politics can be confined to the state and a narrow public sphere, Marxists can be said to believe that 'the economic is political'. From this perspective, civil society, characterized as Marxists believe it to be by class struggle, is the very heart of politics. Views such as these portray politics in largely negative terms. Politics is, quite simply, about oppression and subjugation. Radical feminists hold that society is patriarchal, in that women are systematically subordinated and subjected to male power. Marxists traditionally argued that politics in a capitalist society is characterized by the exploitation of the proletariat by

the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, these negative implications are balanced against the fact that politics is also seen as an emancipating force, a means through which injustice and domination can be challenged. Marx, for instance, predicted that class exploitation would be overthrown by a proletarian revolution, and radical feminists proclaim the need for gender relations to be reordered through a sexual revolution. However, it is also clear that when politics is portrayed as power and domination it need not be seen as an inevitable feature of social existence. Feminists look to an end of 'sexual politics' achieved through the construction of a nonsexist society, in which people will be valued according to personal worth, rather than on the basis of gender. Marxists believe that 'class politics' will end with the establishment of a classless communist society. This, in turn, will eventually lead to the 'withering away' of the state, also bringing politics in the conventional sense to an end.

1.3. Approaches to Political Science:

Disagreement about the nature of political activity is matched by controversy about the nature of politics as an academic discipline. One of the most ancient spheres of intellectual enquiry, politics was originally seen as an arm of philosophy, history or law. Its central purpose was to uncover the principles on which human society should be based. From the late nineteenth century onwards, however, this philosophical emphasis was gradually displaced by an attempt to turn politics into a scientific discipline. The high point of this development was reached in the 1950s and 1960s with an open rejection of the earlier tradition as meaningless metaphysics. Since then, however, enthusiasm for a strict science of politics has waned, and there has been a renewed recognition of the enduring importance of political values and normative theories. If the 'traditional' search for universal values acceptable to everyone has largely been abandoned, so has been the insistence that science alone provides a means of disclosing truth. The resulting discipline is more fertile and more exciting, precisely because it embraces a range of theoretical approaches and a variety of schools of analysis.

A) The philosophical tradition:

The origins of political analysis date back to Ancient Greece and a tradition usually referred to as 'political philosophy'. This involved a preoccupation with essentially ethical, prescriptive or normative questions, reflecting a concern with what 'should', 'ought' or 'must' be brought about, rather than with what 'is'. Plato and Aristotle are usually identified as the founding fathers of this tradition. Their ideas resurfaced in the writings of medieval theorists

such as Augustine (354–430) and Aquinas (1225–74). The central theme of Plato’s work, for instance, was an attempt to describe the nature of the ideal society, which in his view took the form of a benign dictatorship dominated by a class of philosopher kings. Such writings have formed the basis of what is called the ‘traditional’ approach to politics. This involves the analytical study of ideas and doctrines that have been central to political thought. Most commonly, it has taken the form of a history of political thought that focuses on a collection of ‘major’ thinkers (that spans, for instance, Plato to Marx) and a canon of ‘classic’ texts.

This approach has the character of literary analysis: it is interested primarily in examining what major thinkers said, how they developed or justified their views, and the intellectual context within which they worked. Although such analysis may be carried out critically and scrupulously, it cannot be **objective** in any scientific sense, as it deals with normative questions such as ‘Why should I obey the state?’, ‘How should rewards be distributed?’ and ‘What should the limits of individual freedom be?’

B) The Empirical Tradition:

Although it was less prominent than normative theorizing, a descriptive or empirical tradition can be traced back to the earliest days of political thought. It can be seen in Aristotle’s attempt to classify constitutions, in Machiavelli’s realistic account of statecraft, and in Montesquieu’s sociological theory of government and law. In many ways, such writings constitute the basis of what is now called ‘comparative government’, and they gave rise to an essentially institutional approach to the discipline. In the USA, and the UK in particular, this developed into the dominant tradition of analysis. The empirical approach to political analysis is characterized by the attempt to offer a dispassionate and impartial account of political reality. The approach is ‘descriptive’, in that it seeks to analyse and explain, whereas the normative approach is ‘prescriptive’, in the sense that it makes judgements and offers recommendations. Descriptive political analysis acquired its philosophical underpinning from the doctrine of empiricism, which spread from the seventeenth century onwards through the work of theorists such as John Locke and David Hume (1711–76). The doctrine of empiricism advanced the belief that experience is the only basis of knowledge and that, therefore, all hypotheses and theories should be tested by a process of observation. By the nineteenth century, such ideas had developed into what became known as ‘positivism’, an intellectual movement particularly associated with the writings of Auguste Comte (1798–1857). This doctrine proclaimed that the

social sciences, and, for that matter, all forms of philosophical enquiry, should adhere strictly to the methods of the natural sciences. Once science was perceived to be the only reliable means of disclosing truth, the pressure to develop a science of politics became irresistible.

c) Behaviouralism:

Since the mid-nineteenth century, mainstream political analysis has been dominated by the 'scientific' tradition, reflecting the growing impact of positivism. In the 1870s, 'political science' courses were introduced in the universities of Oxford, Paris and Columbia, and by 1906 the *American Political Science Review* was being published. However, enthusiasm for a science of politics peaked in the 1950s and 1960s with the emergence, most strongly in the USA, of a form of political analysis that drew heavily on behaviouralism. For the first time, this gave politics reliably scientific credentials, because it provided what had previously been lacking: objective and quantifiable data against which hypotheses could be tested. Political analysts such as David Easton (1979, 1981) proclaimed that politics could adopt the methodology of the natural sciences, and this gave rise to a proliferation of studies in areas best suited to the use of quantitative research methods, such as voting behaviour, the behaviour of legislators, and the behaviour of municipal politicians and lobbyists. Attempts were also made to apply behaviouralism to IR, in the hope of developing objective 'laws' of international relations. Behaviouralism, however, came under growing pressure from the 1960s onwards. In the first place, it was claimed that behaviouralism had significantly constrained the scope of political analysis, preventing it from going beyond what was directly observable. Although behavioural analysis undoubtedly produced, and continues to produce, invaluable insights in fields such as voting studies, a narrow obsession with quantifiable data threatens to reduce the discipline of politics to little else. More worryingly, it inclined a generation of political scientists to turn their backs on the entire tradition of normative political thought. Concepts such as 'liberty', 'equality', 'justice' and 'rights' were sometimes discarded as being meaningless because they were not empirically verifiable entities. Dissatisfaction with behaviouralism grew as interest in normative questions revived in the 1970s, as reflected in the writings of theorists such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Moreover, the scientific credentials of behaviouralism started to be called into question. The basis of the assertion that behaviouralism is objective and reliable is the claim that it is 'value-free': that is, that it is not contaminated by ethical or normative beliefs. However, if the focus of analysis is observable behaviour, it is difficult to do much more than describe the

existing political arrangements, which implicitly means that the status quo is legitimized. This conservative value bias was demonstrated by the fact that ‘democracy’ was, in effect, redefined in terms of observable behavior. Thus, instead of meaning ‘popular self-government’ (literally, government by the people), democracy came to stand for a struggle between competing elites to win power through the mechanism of popular election. In other words, democracy came to mean what goes on in the so-called democratic political systems of the developed West.

Unit: II (STATE)

2:1. STATE: EVOLUTION AND ELEMENTS:

The state is a political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders, and exercises authority through a set of permanent institutions. These institutions are those that are recognizably ‘public’, in that they are responsible for the collective organization of communal life, and are funded at the public’s expense. The state thus embraces the various institutions of government, but it also extends to the courts, nationalized industries, social security system, and so forth; it can be identified with the entire ‘body politic’

In this light, it is possible to identify five key features of the state:

- ❖ The state is *sovereign*. It exercises absolute and unrestricted power, in that it stands above all other associations and groups in society. Thomas Hobbes (see p. 61) conveyed the idea of sovereignty (see p. 58) by portraying the state as a ‘leviathan’, a gigantic monster, usually represented as a sea creature.
- ❖ State institutions are recognizably ‘*public*’, in contrast to the ‘private’ institutions of civil society. Public bodies are responsible for making and enforcing collective decisions, while private bodies, such as families, private businesses and trade unions, exist to satisfy individual interests.
- ❖ The state is an exercise in *legitimation*. The decisions of the state are usually (although not necessarily) accepted as binding on the members of society because, it is claimed, they are made in the public interest, or for common good; the state supposedly reflects the permanent interests of society.
- ❖ The state is an instrument of *domination*. State authority is backed up by coercion; the state must have the capacity to ensure that its laws are obeyed and that transgressors are punished. For Max Weber (see p. 82), the state was defined by its monopoly of the means of ‘legitimate violence’.

- ❖ The state is a *territorial* association. The jurisdiction of the state is geographically defined, and it encompasses all those who live within the state's borders, whether they are citizens or non-citizens. On the international stage, the state is therefore regarded (at least, in theory) as an autonomous entity.\

ELEMENTS

The classic definition of the state in international law is found in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State (1933). According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, the state has four features:

- ❖ a defined territory
- ❖ a permanent population
- ❖ an effective government
- ❖ Sovereignty, the capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Evolution of State;

Political thinkers and philosophers have tried and attempted to trace out and explain the origin of the state in various methods, according to the nature and the social condition prevailed at the time of their thinking. However, there is no valid answer to “what is the origin of the state”? There were many contradictions in the thesis on what the origin of States. Nowhere in the history has it been recorded when the state came into existence. There were various beliefs regarding the origin of the state, some believe that the origin of the state lie in the hands of God whereas others believe that they are based on social contract and some trust on single force, the family or the process of evolution. The research anthropology ethnology and comparative philosophy had tried to focus on the origin of the state but it was not adequate. Prof. R.N.Gilchrist aptly mentioned that “of the circumstances surrounding the dawn of the political consciousness, we know little or nothing from history, where history fails, we must restore to speculation”. Historical method and evolutionary course of action failed to prove when mankind originally came under the control of state. It is only the imagination of the political scientist and historical researchers that various elements which might have made contribution for the origin of the state. As such, there was no agreeable and acceptable conclusion among the political thinkers regarding the fundamental question of origin and establishment of state.

As a result, there were various theories concerning the primary or pre historical origin of the state propounded by the political scientists and historical researchers. These theories are:

1. The theory of Divine Origin
2. Social Contract Theory
3. Matriarchal and Patriarchal Theory
4. Force Theory
5. Historical or Evolutionary Theory.

The examination and comparison of elements of truth in these thesis shall pave way for finding out the secret in the origin of the state and its generally accepted explanations.

2.1: DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATE and CIVIL SOCIETY

The state is a political association that exercises sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders. As a system of centralized rule that emerged in Europe between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and succeeded in subordinating all other institutions and groups, the state came to dominate political life in all its forms. The spread of the European model of the state to other lands and continents has seen the state become the universal form of political organization around the world.

The relationship of civil society to the state is often depicted as confrontational and zero-sum. This may be the case in certain situations. But in most cases the state and civil society are mutually dependent for survival. As noted earlier, civil society requires governance to survive and governments, at least democratic ones, draw their strength from civil society (Post and Rosenblum 2002). The relationship of civil society to the state can take many forms: co-optation and manipulation of civil society by the state, deep penetration and influence over the state by certain civil society actors, productive tension between the two in a context of overall agreement on the political and economic framework, contestation over certain fundamental issues, alienation and isolation of civil society organizations from the state, or outright rejection of the state by key segments of civil society. Although interconnected, civil society groups must be distinct from the state if they are to influence governance, and the state must have autonomy to protect the rights of all its citizens. This arrangement has been referred to as the principle of double autonomy. Another important sphere in the continuum between private life and the state is political society. Popularized by Alfred Stepan (1988: 3–4), the concept of political society denotes, at least in democratic states, the realm of formal competition for the acquisition and exercise of state power. Political parties, the primary actors in this realm, seek to mobilize public support and to constitute winning coalitions in the formal competition and management of state

power through elections and the constitution of legislatures. Civil society is distinct from political society. While they seek to influence the rules of the game and affect policies, civil society organizations do not organize themselves on a partisan basis to aggregate interests and formally compete for state office. In practice, however, the relationship between civil and political society is often blurred. Many civil society organizations—trade unions, churches, the media, and certain interest groups—affiliate with certain political parties on ideological or ascriptive grounds. They may also wield state power through the political party in office. In the process, they become partners in governance, compromising the distinctiveness and autonomous quality of civil society. Blurring also occurs when the actors and activities of political society are banned or co-opted in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes—dissidents may take refuge in civil society to survive, to construct counter narratives, and to develop networks that can be deployed when the “political opportunity structure” opens up. The distinction between civil society and political society and their merging in practice are useful indicators of the existence of civil society even in the most authoritarian and totalitarian states in a defensive or underground form. Such differentiation is also useful during moments of political transition when proto-party elites exit civil society to form political parties and compete for state office. Civil society then reverts to its conventional state.

In political theory, however, society is often understood in a more specific sense, as what is called ‘civil society’. In its original form, civil society referred to a political community, a community living within a framework of law and exhibiting a common allegiance to a state. Early political thinkers regarded such an ordered society as the basis of civilized life. Modern theorists, however, have tended to draw a clearer distinction between society and the state. In the tradition of Hegel and Marx, civil society takes place outside the state and refers to a realm of autonomous associations and groups, formed by individuals in their capacity as private citizens. Although Hegel treated civil society as separate from the family, most take the term to include the full range of economic, social, cultural, recreational and domestic institutions. The nature and significance of such institutions is, however, a matter of considerable dispute. This often revolves around the relationship between the individual and collective bodies or entities. For instance, can individualism and collectivism be reconciled, or must ‘the individual’ and ‘society’ always stand in opposition to one another? Moreover, society itself has been understood in a bewildering number of ways, each of which has important political implications. Is society, for

example, a human artefact or an organic entity? Is it based upon consensus or conflict? Is society egalitarian or naturally hierarchic? Finally, attention is often drawn to the political significance of social divisions or cleavages, notably social class, gender, race, religion, nationality and language. In some cases, these are thought to hold the key to political understanding. Why are social cleavages important, and which ones have greatest impact upon politics?

PERSPECTIVES OF STATE;

LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

In most Western industrialized countries the state possesses clear liberal democratic features. Liberal-democratic states are, for instance, characterized by constitutional government, a system of checks and balances amongst major institutions, fair and regular elections, a democratic franchise, a competitive party system, the protection of individual rights and civil liberties and so forth. Although there is broad agreement about the characteristic features of the liberal-democratic state, there is far less agreement about the nature of state power and the interests that it represents. Controversy about the nature of the state has, in fact, increasingly dominated modern political analysis and goes to the very heart of ideological and theoretical disagreements. In this sense, the state is an 'essentially contested' concept: there is a number of rival theories of the state, each offering a different account of its origins, development and impact. Mainstream political analysis is dominated by the liberal theory of the state. This dates back to the emergence of modern political theory in the writings of social-contract theorists such as Hobbes and Locke. These thinkers argued that the state had risen out of a voluntary agreement, or social contract, made by individuals who recognized that only the establishment of a sovereign power could safeguard them from the insecurity, disorder and brutality of the 'state of nature'. In liberal theory, the state is thus a neutral arbiter among competing groups and individuals in society; it is an 'umpire' or 'referee', capable of protecting each citizen from the encroachment of his or her fellow citizens. The state is therefore a neutral entity, acting in the interests of all and representing what can be called the 'common good' or 'public interest'.

MARXIST PERSPECTIVE;

Marxism offers an analysis of state power that fundamentally challenges the liberal image of the state as a neutral arbiter or umpire. Marxists argue that the state cannot be understood separate from the economic structure of society: the state emerges out of the class system, its

function being to maintain and defend class domination and exploitation. The classical Marxist view is expressed in Marx and Engels' often-quoted dictum from *The Communist Manifesto* ([1848] 1976): 'the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'. This view was stated still more starkly by Lenin (see p. 83) in *The State and Revolution* ([1917] 1973), who referred to the state simply as 'an instrument for the oppression of the exploited class'. Whereas classical Marxists stressed the coercive role of the state, modern Marxists have been forced to take account of the apparent legitimacy of the 'bourgeois' state, particularly in the light of the achievement of universal suffrage and the development of the welfare state. For example, Gramsci emphasized the degree to which the domination of the ruling class is achieved not only by open coercion but also by the elicitation of consent. He believed that the bourgeoisie had established 'hegemony', ideological leadership or domination, over the proletariat, and insisted that the state plays an important role in this process. Other Marxists have found in Marx himself the more sophisticated notion that the state can enjoy 'relative autonomy' from the ruling class and so can respond at times to the interests of other classes. Nicos Poulantzas (1973) portrayed the state as a 'unifying social formation', capable of diluting class tensions through, for example, the spread of political rights and welfare benefits. However, although this neo-Marxist theory echoes liberalism in seeing the state as an arbiter, it nevertheless emphasizes the class character of the modern state by pointing out that it operates in the long-term interests of capitalism and therefore perpetuates a system of unequal class power.

FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE

Modern thinking about the state must, finally, take account of the implications of feminist theory. However, this is not to say that there is a systematic feminist theory of the state. As emphasized in Chapter 2, feminist theory encompasses a range of traditions and perspectives, and has thus generated a range of very different attitudes towards state power. Moreover, feminists have usually not regarded the nature of state power as a central political issue, preferring instead to concentrate on the deeper structure of male power centered on institutions such as the family and the economic system. Some feminists, indeed, may question conventional definitions of the state, arguing, for instance, that the idea that the state exercises a monopoly of legitimate violence is compromised by the routine use of violence and intimidation in family and domestic life. Nevertheless, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, feminists have

helped to enrich the state debate by developing novel and challenging perspectives on state power. Liberal feminists, who believe that sexual or gender equality can be brought about through incremental reform, have tended to accept an essentially pluralist view of the state. They recognize that, if women are denied legal and political equality, and especially the right to vote, the state is biased in favour of men. However, their faith in the state's basic neutrality is reflected in the belief that any such bias can, and will, be overcome by a process of reform. In this sense, liberal feminists believe that all groups (including women) have potentially equal access to state power, and that this can be used impartially to promote justice and the common good. Liberal feminists have therefore usually viewed the state in positive terms, seeing state intervention as a means of redressing gender inequality and enhancing the role of women. This can be seen in campaigns for equal-pay legislation, the legalization of abortion, the provision of child-care facilities, the extension of welfare benefits, and so on. Nevertheless, a more critical and negative view of the state has been developed by radical feminists, who argue that state power reflects a deeper structure of oppression in the form of patriarchy. There are a number of similarities between Marxist and radical feminist views of state power. Both groups, for example, deny that the state is an autonomous entity bent on the pursuit of its own interests. Instead, the state is understood, and its biases are explained, by reference to a 'deep structure' of power in society at large. Whereas Marxists place the state in an economic context, radical feminists place it in a context of gender inequality, and insist that it is essentially an institution of male power. In common with Marxism, distinctive instrumentalist and structuralist versions of this feminist position have been developed. The *instrumentalist* argument views the state as little more than an agent or 'tool' used by men to defend their own interests and uphold the structures of patriarchy. This line of argument draws on the core feminist belief that patriarchy is rooted in the division of society into distinct 'public' and 'private' spheres of life, men dominating the former while women are confined to the latter. Quite simply, in this view, the state is run *by* men, and *for* men. Whereas instrumentalist arguments focus on the personnel of the state, and particularly the state elite, structuralist arguments tend to emphasize the degree to which state institutions are embedded in a wider patriarchal system. Modern radical feminists have paid particular attention to the emergence of the welfare state, seeing it as the expression of a new kind of patriarchal power. Welfare may uphold patriarchy by bringing about a transition from private dependence (in which women as 'home makers' are dependent on men as 'breadwinners') to a system of

public dependence in which women are increasingly controlled by the institutions of the extended state. For instance, women have become increasingly dependent on the state as clients or customers of state services (such as childcare institutions, nursery education and social work) and as employees, particularly in the so-called 'caring' professions (such as nursing, social work and education).

2.2. State and Welfare

Whereas developmental states practice interventionism in order to stimulate economic progress, social-democratic states intervene with a view to bringing about broader social restructuring, usually in accordance with principles such as fairness, equality, and social justice. In countries such as Austria and Sweden, state intervention has been guided by both developmental and social democratic priorities. Nevertheless, developmentalism and social democracy do not always go hand-in-hand. As Marquand pointed out, although the UK state was significantly extended in the period immediately after World War II along social-democratic lines, it failed to evolve into a developmental state. The key to understanding the social-democratic state is that there is a shift from a 'negative' view of the state, which sees it as little more than a necessary evil, to a 'positive' view of the state, in which it is seen as a means of enlarging liberty and promoting justice. The social-democratic state is thus the ideal of both modern liberals and democratic socialists.

Rather than merely laying down the conditions of orderly existence, the social-democratic state is an active participant; in particular, helping to rectify the imbalances and injustices of a market economy. It therefore tends to focus less upon the generation of wealth and more upon what is seen as the equitable or just distribution of wealth. In practice, this boils down to an attempt to eradicate poverty and reduce social inequality. The twin features of a social democratic state are therefore Keynesianism and social welfare. The aim of Keynesian economic policies is to 'manage' or 'regulate' capitalism with a view to promoting growth and maintaining full employment. Although this may entail an element of planning, the classic Keynesian strategy involves 'demand management' through adjustments in fiscal policy; that is, in the levels of public spending and taxation. The adoption of welfare policies has led to the emergence of so called 'welfare states', whose responsibilities have extended to the promotion of social well-being amongst their citizens. In this sense, the social-democratic state is an 'enabling state', dedicated to the principle of individual empowerment.

UNIT: III (Concepts)

Meaning and Definitions of Liberty:

The word liberty is derived from liber. The root of liberty is another two words libertas and liberte. Liber means “free”. Many people are accustomed to use freedom. But both the words mean same thing and they are used interchangeably. In strict sense there is a difference. We call “freedom movement”, “freedom fighter” etc. but not liberty movement. Liberty is generally used in the case of individual and freedom refers to greater entity such as freedom of a country. But this distinction does not always hold good. For example, we call national liberation movement of Africa or Latin America. Here liberation is used to denote freedom or liberty. In political science, however, the interchangeable use is the general practice.

There is large number of definitions of liberty or freedom. In our day-to-day speech or conversations we use the term to mean absence of constraints or limitations or obstacles. When we find that an individual is free to do as he likes it will be assumed that he is free, that is, he has liberty. Prof. Harold Laski’s definition is well-known and oft-quoted. “By liberty I mean the eager maintenance of that atmosphere in which men have the opportunity to be their best selves”.

1. Laski calls liberty an atmosphere. In the atmosphere, the individual will be permitted to perform such activities that will facilitate the development of the best qualities a man possesses. We can say that freedom is a material condition of social life.
2. Freedom is understood as voluntary and un-coerced action. Behind every action there shall exist spontaneity. When man is forced to do a work that will lead to the loss of liberty. We can say liberty and coercion are antithetical terms. This, however, is not always correct. Sometimes a man is forced to act accordingly to make way for the exercise of freedom to others. If a person creates obstacles, authority removes them by force.

Liberty is Conditional, Not Absolute:

Prof. Ernest Barker, in his noted work, talks about legal liberty and this type of liberty is never absolute but always conditional. He says: “legal liberty, just because it is legal, is not an absolute

or unconditional liberty. The need of liberty for each is necessarily qualified and conditioned by the need of liberty for all". Let us see what Barker wants to say.

Conflicts among Liberties:

Barker has drawn our attention to a very interesting aspect of liberty. He says that in any modern society there are three forms of liberty. These are civil liberty, political liberty and economic liberty. These three types of liberties may come into conflict. How does this happen? His analysis runs in the following manner: By virtue of civil liberty an individual has the freedom to express his opinion through book, article or any other means. But the parliamentarians by virtue of their political liberty can impose restriction upon the freedom of expression or speech. Here civil and political liberties clash with each other and this frequently happens in any society.

Conflict is often found between civil and economic liberties. A worker can claim higher wages or less working hour and this falls within his economic freedom. On the other hand the employer has the civil liberty to enter into contract with the workers dictating the terms of wages, working hours etc. In this way different forms of liberty create conflict among the citizens and Barker believes that this is inevitable. Everyone is eager to enjoy liberty to which he is entitled. There is no way of getting out of this dilemma and remembering this (perhaps) Barker has said that liberty is really a complex notion, it has the capacity to unite men and, at the same time, it divides or disunites them—clash of interest is the cause of disunity.

Positive versus Negative Liberty:

In his analysis of positive and negative liberties Berlin wants to raise the following questions:

- (a) Whether the difference he has drawn between positive and negative liberty is specious or too sharp,
- (b) Whether the term liberty can be extended widely. But while doing so care shall be taken about the retention of significance. In other words, the extension of the meaning of liberty cannot curb the significance of the concept,
- (c) Why political liberty is considered important. Berlin claims that he has slightly amended his earlier version of the concept of negative and positive liberty. This, however, does not change the core idea of liberty.

Berlin has discussed some of the definitions given by leading political scientists of his time. He, in the following way, defines liberty, “The freedom of which I speak is opportunity for action, rather than action itself. If, although I enjoy the right to walk through open doors, I prefer not to do so, but to sit still and vegetate. I am not thereby rendered less free. “Freedom is the opportunity to act, not action itself, the possibility of action, not necessarily that dynamic realization of it”. Berlin refers to a very interesting aspect of liberty.

Normally we say that freedom means when man satisfies his wants. But if he cannot satisfy his wants he must learn the way as to how and in what way he can meet his wants. And, by adopting this method, he can contribute to his happiness. In this case the individuals will have to devise ways of meeting demands.

Negative Concept of Liberty:

Definition:

A man is said to be free to the extent that his actions and movements (and even views) are not controlled by other men or body of men. That is almost everything of a man remains beyond all sorts of control. Berlin defines it in the following language: “Political liberty is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others”. In this definition the important word is unobstructed. To speak the truth this is the core word or idea of Berlin’s definition of negative liberty.

Liberty will be called negative when an individual’s activities remain unobstructed by others. When the activities of a man are interfered by others or when he is coerced by someone he will reasonably be called un-free. So inability caused by coercion is another name of “Un-freedom”. Coercion means deliberate intervention by others and thus freedom and coercion do not coexist.

But, on the contrary, if the inabilities are the consequences of other causes then that cannot be called loss or absence of liberty. A man may be excessively extravagant — naturally he will suffer from poverty and will not be able to meet all the necessary requirements. He will not have the freedom to consult a specialist or make trip round the world or to visit a good eating house. “This inability would not be described as lack of freedom, least of all political freedom”. Berlin says that the inability caused by particular factors is special case.

Negative Liberty and Non-interference:

In the opinion of Berlin freedom in its negative meaning is equivalent to noninterference and he has given special stress on it. A man is free in the sense that he is not interfered with by others. A man will have the scope to do his work without any interference. In the support of his contention Berlin remembers Hobbes. Talking about freedom Hobbes said “A free man is not hindered to do what he hath the will to do? No obstruction will stand on the way of doing anything which a man intends. He further observes that the law is the most powerful “fetter”. So, according to Hobbes, law is the killer of human freedom. But a question here arises. What would exactly be the area of non-interference? Should it be limited or unlimited? Berlin, drawing examples from the writings of traditional political philosophers, has maintained that the area of non-interference must not be unlimited or wide. If everyone wants to have unlimited or very wide area of non-interference, then a situation would arise when everybody will try to interfere with others’ liberty. “The classical English political philosophers disagreed about how wide the area should or could be. They supposed that it could not be unlimited! Because if it were it would entail a state in which all men could boundlessly interfere with all other men, and this kind of “natural” freedom would lead to social chaos”.

Negative Liberty and Interference:

We have just now noticed that negative liberty is not equivalent to complete non-interference. Such a situation will be another name of anarchy and anarchy is not freedom. That is why Berlin suggests that since the interests and aims of different individuals are incompatible a process to harmonise among them shall there be and this is to be done by law. Law will harmonise different objectives of men. In the absence of law or any type of restriction the creation of a political organisation will be meaningless. Not only this, even if an association were set up its credibility will be at the lowest level. Here again a problem arises. What would be the extent of interference? We feel that it is necessary to arrive at a compromise.

This can be better stated in the words of Berlin. “But equally it is assumed, especially by such libertarians as Locke and Mill in England, and Constant and de Tocqueville in France, that there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated”. Absolute non-interference is practically an impossibility. Keeping aside all considerations and issues we assertively say that men are by nature and due to circumstances are interdependent and if that be so there cannot be anything like absolute privacy. Interference, therefore, must occur and it will be taken as *fait accompli*.

Minimum Freedom:

Berlin has drawn our attention to a real situation. It is admitted on all hands that everyone shall have the opportunity to enjoy freedom and necessary steps to that extent are to be taken. But here arises a crucial problem. When in a society large number of men are underfed, naked, suffer from various diseases, they are deprived of basic education, is it not a political claptrap to allow them enjoy freedom? Freedom is essential for all residents of a society. But which one is to be given priority- medicine, education, clothing or freedom? A peasant or an ordinary man must have the minimum freedom to have food, clothes, medicine and when this minimum freedom is achieved, he can claim larger amount of liberty which includes political liberty. But neglecting minimum liberty and thinking about larger amount of liberty is nothing but a mockery.

Liberty is a goal and indeed a very coveted goal but it cannot be treated in isolation. A society must make all sorts of efforts to reach the goal of minimum liberty and after that there shall be arrangements for ensuring greater liberty. Once Prof. Laski said that everyone had the right (or liberty) to take minimum food and when this liberty is attained some may claim to have cake. The satisfaction of minimum needs is the primary condition for granting better and higher privileges. J. S. Mill also said that all are entitled to minimum freedom.

Berlin and Mill:

In the course of his detailed analysis of negative notion of liberty Berlin refers to another famous thinker—J. S. Mill. Mill is also a protagonist of liberty and this is termed by many as negative liberty. Mill in his *On Liberty* had forcefully argued for unobstructed liberty. He said, “The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way”. It may be stated here that this is the gist of Mill’s theory of liberty. Though Mill did not categorically mention the removal of limitation he, in his mind, had that idea. To him freedom was equivalent to pursuance of one’s own good and any obstruction could be regarded as inimical to liberty. Why did Mill give so much importance to liberty? If we cursorily go through his *On Liberty*, we shall find that without adequate liberty civilisation could not progress. That is why he gave maximum importance to liberty. Mill believed that the progress of human civilisation was far more important than throttling the voice of some persons in the name of expanding freedom. Berlin discovers few discrepancies in Mill’s analysis of liberty. One is that according to Mill all coercion is bad. But when coercion is applied to combat greater evil this should also be bad—Mill does not say. Another inconsistency, according to Berlin is, men should strive to find out the truth and that truth is to be found only in freedom. Though these two are liberal assumptions “they are not identical”. Berlin nevertheless, agrees with Mill’s views of liberty because it is modern.

Negative Liberty and Privacy:

When liberty is viewed in negative terms, the absence of external interference, it is closely linked with privacy. Because the external interference encroaches upon the exclusively private affairs of individuals and in Western society it is always given priority. Privacy is different from public realm and privacy conscious individuals do not intend any violation. Not only this, it is believed that a major part of the affairs, of the men of Western society comprises private affairs. They also treat private affairs as sacrosanct. It has also been asserted that all the private affairs shall be within the management and control of individuals and the state authority has nothing to do with these affairs. So far as the private realm is concerned the individuals should be left alone.

“Any intrusion to the privacy of persons is, in this sense, an infringement of their liberty. To prize negative freedom is clearly to prefer the private to the public and to wish to enlarge the scope of the former at the expense of the latter”. It is still believed in the Western countries that education, health, to pursue arts etc. are all subjects of private realm and the state has nothing to do with all these.

These should be left entirely at the hands or discretion of the individuals. Even the state interference in economic field is uncalled for. A large section of modern liberal thinkers forcefully argue that the state should refrain from interfering in the economic activities because these are private affairs and the individuals understand these far better than the state.

Negative Liberty and Rationality:

Unlimited faith on the rationality and individuality of person is treated as a potential cause of the popularity of negative freedom. It is believed that the individuals are more or less rational and behind their activities there is proof of rationality. Though this has not been clearly stated by the advocates of negative freedom, it is surmised that each person understands his own interests and knows how to protect them. If the individuals are left alone they are capable of protecting their interests properly and efficiently.

On the other hand, if the state interferes and coercion is frequently applied in the name of general interests that will frustrate the spontaneity of the individuals. So, for the sake of proper development of rationality and furtherance of spontaneity it is essential that the state interference should be reduced to the lowest level. Modern thinkers have called the state interference as a type of paternalism and all forms of paternalism, however, well-intentioned, is enough to dwarf the responsibility and spontaneity of individuals.

Naturally any type of paternalism or attempt of paternalism must be nipped in the bud. It has been argued that if the individuals are left to themselves they will commit mistakes and that may inflict temporary loss to the economy or interests of the society. But the other side, and it is the bright side, of the picture is they will learn the right lesson from their mistakes and this is very important. State interference sometimes can guide the individuals but that can never be the permanent feature of state.

Positive Freedom:

Definition:

The positive meaning of liberty may be defined in the following words: It means that the individual is his own master. The life and decisions of one will depend on the individuals themselves. The individual is the instrument of his own affairs. The positive sense of freedom is concerned with the question "By whom am I governed?" rather than "How much am I governed?" "I wish to be a subject, not an object, to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, not by causes which affect me. I wish to be somebody, not nobody, a doer deciding not being decided for, self directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, an animal or a slave incapable of playing a human role".

The positive sense of freedom wants to emphasize the following:

"The freedom which consists in being one's own master and the freedom which consists in not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men". The paradox of positive freedom has been explained beautifully by Heywood, "Indeed a demos that imposes many restrictive laws on itself may be positively free but negatively quite un-free. In its other sense, positive freedom relates to the ideas of self-realisation and personal development". "I feel free to the degree that I believe this is true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise that it is not".

Positive Freedom and Self-realization:

Berlin has assertively said that there is a close relationship between positive liberty and self-realisation. The best way of attaining self-realisation (realisation of the best self which a man possesses) is the positive form of freedom. Every individual has his own motive, mission and vision; he wants to act to fulfill that mission or vision. He decides his own method and makes plan. All these he will do as a free man. It means the person will have freedom. Freedom as he understands. He will utilise the freedom in his own way.

But the realisation of self will never be possible if congenial atmosphere is not available. It means that the individual will not feel any obstruction which stands on the way of self-realisation. Berlin says that self-realisation cannot thrive in vacuum or in an atmosphere free

from all sorts of obstructions. Berlin maintains, “The notion of liberty is not the negative conception of a field without obstacles a vacuum in which nothing obstructs me but the notion of self-direction or self-control”. What a man wants to do, he will have the opportunity and freedom to do. Berlin says that there is the necessity of obstruction for the realisation of self.

The aim of the restriction imposed by the state of society will be to help the furtherance of self-realisation. It has been assumed that obstructions are not always harmful. They have good effects and here lies the fundamental difference between negative freedom and positive freedom.

Relationship between Two Freedoms:

We have discussed two types of liberty and now we like to throw light, on the probable relationship between these two. The word probable is used here to mean that the purest form of negative or positive liberty is not found in real society. No liberty is absolutely negative or positive. Nevertheless there is a relationship between them. Berlin had earlier raised the issue which we have already noted. He asked whether the difference between negative and positive liberty is specious.

He proceeds to analyse the relation in this way. Berlin says that the two questions- How much am I governed? and by whom am I governed?—are not quite identical. But this is not to say that the distinction between these two questions is unimportant. Let us see what Berlin exactly says, “I confess that I cannot see either that the two questions are identical, or that the difference is unimportant”. He admits that two types of liberty are different but the relation between them cannot be ignored and Berlin has emphasised this.

In his analysis we find that there are many obstacles which the man cannot remove or ignore, and if these are not removed the development of personality or freedom will receive serious setback. For the removal of these obstacles the interference of an authority is indispensable.

This proves that freedom cannot be the absence of restraints. Berlin concludes “despite the heroic efforts to transcend or dissolve the conflicts and resistance to others, if I do not wish to be deceived, I shall recognise the fact that total harmony with others is incompatible with self-identity”. What he wants to say is that there cannot be compatibility among the interests of different men. If so, outside interference is a must. But that does not mean that persons will not have an area which can be called exclusive.

The two concepts of liberty—negative and positive—have very often been separately treated by their advocates. But a close scrutiny between them reveals that in ultimate analysis there is no important difference. The aims of both liberties are almost same. Both want the development of the qualities of men. Some people think that the removal of all hindrances can help the attainment of the objectives.

On the contrary, others are of opinion that some sorts of outside interference are necessary. This is chiefly due to the reason that there are incompatibilities in interests and aims of differences and for their removal force or coercion is essential. Here the coercion should not be treated as abductor but liberator.

Coercion liberates individuals from enslavement. Since there is no fixed area of positive and negative liberties there is every possibility of overlapping. In society this overlapping frequently occurs. The distinction between the two is pedantic and psychological. It is the personal preference of the thinker.

Curtailement of Liberty:

Some critics have pertinently asked—Can the number of liberty be expanded and significance of liberty be kept intact? It is a very complex question and cannot be answered directly. Enhancement of the number of liberty is absolutely desirable. But there is a lot of difference between to desire liberty and the translation of desire into reality. How much liberty a citizen can enjoy depends on the social, economic and political structure of society and, simultaneously, on the persons themselves. The citizens may cherish in mind to enjoy liberty but many hindrances stand on their way and this results in curtailment of liberty.

If we go through the history of Western political thought we shall find that from the middle Ages people are experiencing the curtailment of liberty. In the middle Ages individuals had very little religious freedom. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the rise of absolute monarchy drastically curbed freedom of general public. There were agitations no doubt but the situation did not improve considerably.

The Industrial Revolution of the second-half of the eighteenth century turned the situation to a different direction. The fabulous amount of wealth generated by Industrial Revolution was practically captured by a handful of capitalists leading to the gross inequalities of wealth and income. The number of have-nots began to increase astronomically. The have-nots were deprived of basic requirements of life.

In other words, the economic liberty was enjoyed by few persons and the majority was deprived of it. It is a tragedy that the stalwart liberals stridently advocated for liberty but their arguments were confined within the academic analysis. The result was that there was hardly any perceptible improvement in the condition of liberty. Two opposite tendencies have developed in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One is there has arisen an increasing claim for more and more liberty and, on the other hand, different techniques are being devised to corner the future prospects of liberty, especially in its positive sense.

The dominant class and elite groups are active and in various ways— they have established their full control over different branches of state authority. This has mutilated the basic norms of democracy based on liberty. So while we are talking about more and more liberty

the tendency is developing in opposite direction. We wish to conclude this point by quoting large passage from Berlin's book: "Nor do I wish to deny that the new ways in which liberty, both in its positive and negative sense, can be and has been, curtailed have arisen since the nineteenth century. In an age of expanding economic productivity there exist ways of curtailing both types of liberty—for example—by permitting or promoting a situation in which entire groups and nations are progressively shut off from benefits which have been allowed to accumulate exclusively in the hands of other groups and nations, the rich and strong—a situation which, in turn, has produced ... social arrangements that have caused walls to arise around men and doors to be shut to the development of individuals and classes".

Importance of Political Liberty:

To the bourgeois theoreticians and politicians political liberty is of prime importance. It is because the political liberty means people's right to pursue their own aims and interests in political field without any apprehension of state interference. The liberalisation of political liberty or its expansion beyond the narrow limits prescribed by some will undoubtedly enable the citizens to pursue their own objectives which will ultimately accelerate the development of society. It has also been argued that freedom in the political sphere will have a positive impact on the economic sphere. People will get enough opportunities as well as freedom to proceed with their economic functions without any hindrance. The laissez faire doctrine, though primarily based on economic freedom, it does not ignore the political freedom because liberty in political fields will encourage citizens to start new schemes in other fields.

This can be illustrated by the functioning of democracy. Modern political scientists think in these terms. The New Right concept developed in the seventies and eighties of the last century wanted a general shift from the state oriented organisation to market- oriented organisation and this was implemented by Reagan in USA and Margaret Thatcher in Britain. Robert Nozick also propounded a theory of minimal state. All these reveal that political liberty is to be given maximum importance. Of course arguments against this approach are huge in number. However, the fact is that the forward march of market economy has accompanied with it the political liberty.

3.2. EQUILITY: DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

Equality is a highly complex concept, there being as many forms of equality as there are ways of comparing the conditions of human existence. For instance, it is possible to talk about moral equality, legal equality, political equality, social equality, sexual equality, racial equality and so forth. Moreover, the principle of equality has assumed a number of forms, the most significant of which have been formal equality, equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.

Although the ideas of equal opportunities and equal outcome developed out of an original commitment to formal equality, there are times when they point in very different directions. For instance, supporters of legal equality may roundly denounce equality of opportunities when this implies discrimination in favour of the poor or disadvantaged. Similarly, advocates of social equality may attack the notion of equal opportunities on the grounds that it amounts to the right to be unequal. Egalitarianism thus encompasses a broad range of views, and its political character has been the subject of deep disagreement.

Formal Equality;

The earliest notion of equality to have had an impact on political thought is what may be called 'foundational equality', suggesting that all people are equal by virtue of a shared human essence. Such an idea arose out of the natural rights theories that dominated political thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The American Declaration of Independence, for example, declares simply that, 'All men are created equal', and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen states that, 'Men are born and remain free and equal in rights'. The idea that all human beings are possessors of equal rights is the basis of what is usually called 'formal equality'. Formal equality implies that, by virtue of their common humanity, each person is entitled to be treated equally by the rules of social practice. The most obvious, and perhaps most important, manifestation of formal equality is the principle of legal equality, or 'equality before the law'. This holds that the law should treat each person as an individual, showing no regard to their social background, religion, race, colour, gender and so forth.

Equality of opportunity;

Formal equality pays attention to the status people enjoy either as human beings or in the eyes of the law; it does not address their 'opportunities', the circumstances in which they live and the chances or prospects available to them. Equality of opportunity is concerned principally with initial conditions, with the starting point of life. Very often sporting metaphors are employed to convey this sense, such as an 'equal start' in life, or that life should be played on a 'level playing field'. To confine equality to the initial circumstances of life, however, can have radically inegalitarian implications. Natural inequality, arising from personal talents, skills, hard work and so on, is considered to be either inevitable or morally 'right'; in Margaret Thatcher's words there is a 'right to be unequal'. However, inequalities that are bred by social circumstances, such as poverty, homelessness or unemployment, are morally 'wrong', because

they allow some to start the race of life halfway down the running track while other competitors may not even have arrived at the stadium.

Equality of outcome;

The idea of an equality of outcome is the most radical and controversial face of egalitarianism. Whereas equal opportunities requires that significant steps are taken towards achieving greater social and economic equality, far more dramatic changes are necessary if 'outcomes' are to be equalized.

A concern with 'outcomes' rather than 'opportunities' shifts attention away from the starting point of life to its end results, from chances to rewards. Equality of outcome implies that all runners finish the race in line together, regardless of their starting point and the speed at which they run. Advocates of equality of outcome, whether in its moderate or radical sense, usually argue that it is the most vital form of equality, since without it other forms of equality are a sham. Equal legal and civil rights are, for example, of little benefit to citizens who do not possess a secure job, a decent wage, a roof over their head and so forth.

Equality - Liberalism v Socialism

Support for equality amongst liberals is very different to that of socialists. Whereas liberals argue in favour of state intervention to enhance equal opportunities, socialists favour a more equitable distribution of wealth and resources.

The distinction between a liberal and a socialist in terms of equality is analogous to a race. Liberals will always support legislative measures designed to ensure a more even start in life. However, liberals tend to oppose those measures that confiscate wealth from those who work hard. Liberals take the view that people's abilities and aptitude for work differs greatly. Provided the start is relatively equal, the outcome should be viewed as a fair one. An uneven distribution of wealth is therefore entirely compatible with liberalism. Liberals claim that an unequal outcome is socially just. In contrast, equality of outcome, as in socialism, treats unlike individuals alike – which is anathema to any genuine liberal. The liberal perspective is based upon the premise that a dichotomy exists between equality and liberty. Inevitably, society must make a choice between equality of outcome or the preservation of individual liberty. This argument is particularly vociferous amongst classical liberals. For instance, Milton Friedman observed

that “a society that puts equality ahead of freedom will end up with neither equality nor freedom.”

From a similar position, Friedrich Hayek (1988) argued that “a society that does not recognise that each individual has values of his own which he is entitled to follow can have no respect for the dignity of the individual and cannot really know freedom.”

3.3. Procedural versus Substantive Justice

A third distinction that must be drawn is between the justice of the procedures that might be used to determine how benefits and burdens of various kinds are allocated to people, and the justice of the final allocation itself. It might initially seem as though the justice of a procedure can be reduced to the justice of the results produced by applying it, but this is not so. For one thing, there are cases in which the idea of an independently just outcome makes no sense. A coin toss is a fair way of deciding who starts a game, but neither the Blues nor the Reds have a claim of justice to bat first or kick off. But even where a procedure has been shaped by a concern that it should produce substantively just outcomes, it may still have special properties that make it intrinsically just. In that case, using a different procedure to produce the same result might be objectionable. In an influential discussion, John Rawls contrasted *perfect procedural justice*, where a procedure is such that if it is followed a just outcome is guaranteed (requiring the person who cuts a cake to take the last slice himself is the illustration Rawls provides), *imperfect procedural justice*, where the procedure is such that following it is likely, but not certain, to produce the just result, and *pure procedural justice*, such as the coin-tossing example, where there is no independent way to assess the outcome – if we call it just, it is only on the grounds that it has come about by following the relevant procedure .

Theories of justice can then be distinguished according to the relative weight they attach to procedures and substantive outcomes. Some theories are purely procedural in form. Robert Nozick distinguished between historical theories of justice, end-state theories, and patterned theories in order to defend the first against the second and third. An end-state theory defines justice in terms of some overall property of a distribution (of resources, welfare, etc.) – for example whether it is egalitarian, or whether the lowest position in the distribution is as high as it can be, as Rawls’ difference principle requires. A patterned theory looks at whether what each receives as part of a distribution matches some individual feature such as their desert or their need. By contrast, an historical theory asks about the process by which the final outcome has

arisen. In Nozick's particular case, a distribution of resources is said to be just if everyone within its scope is entitled to what they now own, having acquired it by legitimate means – such as voluntary contract or gift – from someone who was also entitled to have it, leading back eventually to a just act of acquisition – such as labouring on a plot of land – that gave the first owner his valid title. The shape of the final distribution is irrelevant: according to Nozick, justice is entirely a matter of the sequence of prior events that created it (for critical assessments of Nozick's position).

For most philosophers, however, the justice of a procedure is to a large extent a function of the justice of the outcomes that it tends to produce when applied. For instance, the procedures that together make up a fair trial are justified on the grounds that for the most part they produce outcomes in which the guilty are punished and the innocent are acquitted. Yet even in these cases, we should be wary of assuming that the procedure itself has no independent value. We can ask of a procedure whether it treats the people to whom it is applied justly, for example by giving them adequate opportunities to advance their claims, not requiring them to provide personal information that they find humiliating to reveal, and so forth. Studies by social psychologists have shown that in many cases people care more about being treated fairly by the institutions they have to deal with than about how they fare when the procedure's final result is known.

Corrective versus Distributive Justice

A second important contrast, whose pedigree reaches back at least as far as Aristotle, is between justice as a principle for assigning distributable goods of various kinds to individual people, and justice as a remedial principle that applies when one person wrongly interferes with another's legitimate holdings. Thus suppose Bill steals Alice's computer, or sells Alice faulty goods which he claims to be in perfect order: then Alice suffers a loss, which justice demands that Bill should remedy by returning the computer or fulfilling his contract honestly. Corrective justice, then, essentially concerns a bilateral relationship between a wrongdoer and his victim, and demands that the fault be cancelled by restoring the victim to the position she would have been in had the wrongful behaviour not occurred; it may also require that the wrongdoer not benefit from his faulty behaviour. Distributive justice, on the other hand, is multilateral: it assumes a distributing agent, and a number of persons who have claims on what is being distributed. Justice here requires that the resources available to the distributor be shared

according to some relevant criterion, such as equality, desert, or need. In Aristotle's example, if there are fewer flutes available than people who want to play them, they should be given to the best performers. In modern debates, principles of distributive justice are applied to social institutions such as property and tax systems, which are understood as producing distributive outcomes across large societies, or even the world as a whole.

The conceptual distinction between distributive and corrective justice seems clear, but their normative relationship is more difficult to pin down. Some have claimed that corrective justice is merely instrumental to distributive justice: its aim is to move from a situation of distributive injustice brought about by the faulty behaviour to one that is more nearly (if not perfectly) distributively just. But this view runs into a number of objections. One is that so long as Alice has a legitimate title to her computer, her claim of corrective justice against Bill does not depend on her having had, prior to the theft, the share of resources that distributive justice ideally demands. She might be richer than she deserves to be, yet corrective justice still require that the computer be returned to her. In other words, corrective justice may serve to promote conservative rather than ideal justice, to use the distinction introduced in 2.1. Another objection is that corrective justice requires the wrongdoer himself to restore or compensate the person he has wronged, even if the cause of distributive justice could be better served by transferring resources from a third party – giving Alice one of even-more-undeservedly-rich Charles's computers, for example. This underlines the bilateral nature of corrective justice, and also the fact that it comes into play in response to faulty behaviour on someone's part. Its primary demand is that people should not lose out because others have behaved wrongfully or carelessly, but it also encompasses the idea that 'no man should profit by his own wrong'. If Alice loses her computer in a boating accident, she might, under an insurance scheme, have a claim of *distributive* justice to a new machine, but she has no claim of *corrective* justice.

If corrective justice cannot be subsumed normatively under distributive justice, we need to explain its value. What is achieved when we make Bill return the computer to Alice? Aristotle suggested that corrective justice aims to restore the two parties to a position of equality; by returning the computer we cancel both Bill's unjustified gain and Alice's unjustified loss. But this assumes that the computer can be returned intact. Corrective justice requires that Alice be made no worse off than she was before the theft, even if that means Bill suffering an absolute loss (e.g. by paying for a new computer if he has damaged Alice's). Aristotle himself recognized

that the idea of evening out gain and loss made no literal sense in a case where one person assaults another and has to compensate him for his injury – there is no ‘gain’ to be redistributed. It seems, then, that the value of corrective justice must lie in the principle that each person must take responsibility for his own conduct, and if he fails to respect the legitimate interests of others by causing injury, he must make good the harm. In that way, each person can plan her life secure in the knowledge that she will be protected against certain kinds of external setbacks. Philosophers and lawyers writing on corrective justice disagree about what standard of responsibility should apply – for example whether compensation is required only when one person wilfully or negligently causes another to suffer loss, or whether it can also be demanded when the perpetrator displays no such fault but is nevertheless causally responsible for the injury.

3.4. CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship is a contested and sensitive issue. The interpretations and meanings connected with citizenship vary in different societies and in different times. Citizenship is a central concept in political philosophy: it is a framework for political democracy and individual autonomy as well as an intellectual and political tradition that connects the modern era with antiquity.

In its simplest form, a ‘citizen’ is a member of a political community who is endowed with a set of rights and a set of obligations. Citizenship therefore represents a relationship between the individual and the state, in which the two are bound together by reciprocal rights and obligations. However, the precise nature of this relationship is the subject of considerable argument and dispute. For example, some view citizenship as a legal status which can be defined objectively, while others see it as an identity, a sense of loyalty or belonging. The most contentious question, however, relates to the precise nature of citizen’s rights and obligations, and the balance between the two. Although citizenship often appears to be ‘above politics’ in the sense that most, if not all, theorists are prepared to endorse it, in practice there are competing concepts of citizenship.

The roots of the concept are in the Greek polis and the Roman res publica. Pocock describes the “‘classical’ account of citizenship as an Athenian ideal” i.e. as a male warrior, found in Aristotle’s Politics. In Politics, Aristotle states that a citizen “is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens and who holds an office or is in some other way participating in the deliberative or judicial administration of the state: The scope of the rights of citizenship

has expanded since antiquity to incorporate more groups of people and the framework of citizenship has widened from being local into a state-wide institution. The increased importance of membership has brought the concept of citizenship and what it means to be a citizen into the forefront of public discussion again. In modern Western political thought the concept of citizenship is closely connected with the idea of a self-governing community i.e. a sovereign state.

Elements of citizenship;

To define the citizen simply as ‘a member of a political community’ is hopelessly vague. One attempt to refine the notion of citizenship is to define its legal substance, by reference to the specific rights and obligations which a state invests in its members. ‘Citizens’ can therefore be distinguished from ‘aliens’. The most fundamental right of citizenship is thus the right to live and work in a country, something which ‘aliens’ or ‘foreign citizens’ may or may not be permitted to do, and then only under certain conditions and for a limited period. Citizens may also be allowed to vote, stand for election and enter certain occupations, notably military or state service, which may not be open to non-citizens. However, legal citizenship only designates a formal status, without in any way indicating that the citizen feels that he or she is a member of a political community. In that sense, citizenship must always have a subjective or psychological component: the citizen is distinguished by a frame of mind, a sense of loyalty towards his or her state, even a willingness to act in its defence. The mere possession of legal rights does not in itself ensure that individuals will feel themselves to be citizens of that country. Members of groups that feel alienated from their state, perhaps because of social disadvantage or racial discrimination, cannot properly be thought of as ‘full citizens’, even though they may enjoy a range of formal entitlements. Not uncommonly, such people regard themselves as ‘second class citizens’, if not as ‘third class citizens’.

The classic contribution to the study of citizenship rights was undertaken by T.H. Marshall in ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (1963). Marshall defined citizenship as ‘full membership of a community’ and attempted to outline the process through which it was achieved. In Marshall’s view, the first rights to develop were ‘civil rights’, broadly defined as ‘rights necessary for individual freedom’. These include freedom of speech, assembly, movement, conscience, the right to equality before the law, to own property, enter into contracts and so forth. Civil rights are therefore rights exercised within civil society, and their existence

depends upon the establishment of limited government, government that respects the autonomy of the individual. Second, there are ‘political rights’ which provide the individual with the opportunity to participate in political life. The central political rights are obviously the right to vote, to stand for election and to hold public office. The provision of political rights clearly requires the development of universal suffrage, political equality and democratic government. Finally, Marshall identified a range of ‘social rights’ which guarantee the citizen a minimum social status. These rights are diverse but, in Marshall’s opinion, include the right to basic economic welfare, social security and what he described, rather vaguely, as the right ‘to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society’. The provision of social rights requires the development of a welfare state and an extension of state responsibilities into economic and social life.

UNIT- IV (CONCEPTS)

DEMOCRACY: 4.1. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE

The term ‘Democracy’ has been used in the tradition of western political thought since ancient times. In Greek there are two words—*demos* and *kratos*. The former means people while the latter rule and what we mean by democracy in English is rule of the people. David Held, a renowned authority on the concept, defines the term as “Democracy means a form of government in which, in contradistinction monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. Democracy entails a political community in which there is some form of political equality among the people”. Precisely stated, democracy is the rule by the people. Of all the definitions of democracy perhaps the best and most popular definition is the following: It is called “the government of the people, by the people and for the people”.

The former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) is the author of this definition. Lincoln uttered this definition in his Gettysburg Address delivered in 1864. The sixties of the nineteenth century witnessed the height of the American Civil War between the Northern and Southern states. Even today Lincoln’s definition is treated by many as a classical one and any discussion of democracy cannot skip this.

Following points may help us to understand the term more easily

1. Democracy is a form of government in which people’s participation is of primary importance.
2. People may participate either directly or indirectly.

3. It is a form of government in which people have equal opportunity and this type of government is based on individual merit and no place of hereditary privilege is to be found in democracy.
4. Distribution of opportunities is adopted for reduction or removal of inequalities.
5. Democracy recognizes that all the sections of the community will receive their due shares.
6. Interests of the minorities will be duly protected and state makes arrangements for that.
7. All the public offices and opportunities are opened to everyone and to fill the posts public examinations are held. There is also open competition on in which every eligible citizen has the right to participate.
8. It is a system of government which does not make any discrimination on the basis of caste, religion, sex, birth etc.
9. In democracy all must have the scope to govern or to be a member of government.
10. Rulers are to be accountable to the ruled and forms of accountability are many.
11. Rules are to be chosen by the ruled.
12. People shall have the right to decide who would rule them

PROCEDURAL DEMOCRACY;

The assessment of democracy depends on the indices used to indicate or measure it. Models- one related to the institutional Approach, i.e., procedural democracy; Second one, related to the substantive or effective democracy. Certain institutional Practices or Arrangements, The institutional perspective views democracy in terms of the presence of the institutions of democracy, political parties and other associations or organizations, periodic elections, universal adult franchise, leadership, etc.

The latter does not consider the institutional/procedural/electoral democracy as comprehensive indicator of the democracy. The electoral democracy, in fact, is minimalist, which is also marked by a large number of factors which are inimical substantive to democracy. It is rarely concerned with what happens beyond elections, in the social space. For example:

North Korea's official name is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While its constitution might pay lip service to elections and the importance of the people, it has no substantive democracy. This is common in many dictatorships where "elections" are held and the dictator is conveniently elected by 99% of the people for the 50th year in a row.

SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY;

Alternatively, the substantive democracy views the phenomenon of democracy in the light of its desegregation and diffusions, redistributive justice, human capabilities and entitlements (education, health, infrastructure, etc.), social capital/associated factors (trust, values, norms), civil society, human rights and dignities, governance (participation, accountability, efficacy, transparency, etc.)

The observers of the procedural democracy largely believe that democracy in India has been successful. The criteria for this assessment are - participation and competition. These are indicated by the frequency of the elections in India and competition along political parties to contest elections. The percentage of turn out and the percentage of votes polled by parties are indicators of participation. Those who see success of democracy in terms of elections-participation and competition follow survey methods to measure democracy. They infer the dominant trends in the election in terms of the turn out and the percentage of vote or use of statistical method - correlation, coefficient or the regression analysis.

Successful democracy is a holistic idea; it encompasses both procedural aspects – political equality, effective institutions, free and fair elections, legislative assemblies and constitutional governments, and good voter turn outs; and substantive aspects – socio-economic equality of citizens, tolerance for different opinions, ruler accountability, respect for the rules, and a strong political engagement.

Both aspects are complementary and dependent. They reinforce one another and also interfere with one another. Socio-economic inequality will interfere with the achievement of political equality. Thus, successful functioning of procedural aspects of democracy requires some aspects of substantive – tolerance, equality etc.

RIGHTS 4.2. UNIVERSALISM VERSES PARTICULARISM

There are many definitions of rights and for our purpose some are stated. One such definition is rights are legal or moral recognition of choices or interests to which particular weight is attached. A person is faced with a number of alternatives or choices and he is to select one or two of them.

This freedom is the central idea of rights. The individual shall have the full freedom to select the required number of alternatives. The system of rights therefore denotes “some sort of distribution of freedom” (Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics).

The second definition is that rights can be called justified and recognised expectation. It is justified in the sense that when one claims rights there shall be sufficient justification behind the claims and, at the same time, the claims should be recognized. The claims have been termed by L. T. Hobhouse as expectation. It is so people expect them for their betterment. Justification and recognition have landed the expectation (or rights) on a different level. A man’s expectation for ethical right cannot come under the purview of political science. T. H. Green defines rights in the light of idealism since he was the doyen of English idealist philosophy. He defines the concept of rights: “The capacity on the part of the individual of conceiving a good as the same for himself and others and of being determined to action by that conception is foundation of rights, and rights are the condition of that capacity being realised. No right is justifiable or should be a right except on the ground that directly or indirectly it serves this purpose”

Andrew Heywood (Political Theory) calls rights as entitlements (emphasis added). Rights are entitlements to act or be treated in a particular way. Modern political thinkers are accustomed to treat rights mainly as entitlements. It is a type of entitlement in the sense that an individual has rights means that he is entitled to have something. In the present day situation rights have been regarded as rational claims. The environmentalists have challenged the traditional concept of rights. They forcefully argue that every claim made by the individuals must be based on rationality. Human beings cannot kill animals indiscriminately or destroy forest for their own benefit.

These two acts may satisfy their needs but at the same time the killing of animals or destroying forest shall cause an imbalance in nature and ultimately society and succeeding generations will suffer. So the idea of entitlement shall be viewed from modern and wider perspective. Again, in the age of globalisation the concept of rights is to be properly viewed.

While claiming to enjoy rights one must see that whether that claim is about to jeopardies the interests of the other people of the globe. Hence the narrow concept of rights, in modern day, is irrelevant.

Nature of Rights:

There are several features of rights as a concept of political theory:

- (1) Norman Barry uses a new term which he calls claim-rights. Let us quote him: “In the more usual sense of the word right it is understood as a type of claim. Claim-rights entitle their holder to limit the liberty of another person.
- (2) A has a right against B, deriving either from moral or legal rule, which puts B under a duty. It is not the moral quality of act that entitles A to limit B’s liberty but simply the fact that he possesses the rights..... Claim-rights possessed by persons are quite different from favours or concessions granted to individuals by authorities”.
- (3) The claim-rights do not depend upon the mercy of another person. For one reason or other individuals claim rights which means that others will not create any obstructions on the way of enjoying the claim-rights. The implication of this right is individuals claim-right on the ground that the rights are indispensable for the development of personality and the authority is bound to provide such right.
- (4) Right is viewed in the sense of liberty, right is liberty. There is a general and popular view that rights imply duties. A man cannot claim/demand rights if he does not perform duties. Rights, in this sense, are correlative to duties or functions. But when rights are interpreted in the background of liberty the doing of duty does not arise at all.
For example, an individual has right of the freedom of speech means that the individual has liberty to open his mouth and mind and if he does so he will face no problem. When rights are understood as liberties, the possession of rights by one person does not entail the restrictions on liberty of another or in the sense of being under a correlative duty. This concept of right denies the traditional relation between right and duty.
- (5) Identification of rights as special claims is another characteristic feature of rights. In the period of monarchical absolutism people claimed the right to freedom of speech because it was drastically curtailed by the absolute kings. Not only freedom of speech, but also freedom of thought and action were demanded by people.

- (6) Identification of rights as special claims is another characteristic feature of rights. In the period of monarchical absolutism people claimed the right to freedom of speech because it was drastically curtailed by the absolute kings. Not only freedom of speech, but also freedom of thought and action were demanded by people.

POWER: 4.4.

In the natural sciences, power is usually understood as 'force' or 'energy'. In the social sciences, the most general concept of power links it to the ability to achieve a desired outcome, sometimes referred to as power to. In most cases, however, power is thought of as a relationship, as the exercise of control by one person over another, or as power over. A distinction is, nevertheless, sometimes drawn between forms of such control, between what is termed 'power' and what is thought of as 'influence'. Power is here seen as the capacity to make formal decisions which are in some way binding upon others, whether these are made by teachers in the classroom, parents in the family or by government ministers in relation to the whole of society. Influence, by contrast, is the ability to affect the content of these decisions through some form of external pressure, highlighting the fact that formal and binding decisions are not made in a vacuum. Influence may therefore involve anything from organised lobbying and rational persuasion, through to open intimidation.

One attempt to resolve these controversies is to accept that power is an 'essentially contested' concept and to highlight its various concepts or conceptions, acknowledging that no settled or agreed definition can ever be developed. This is the approach adopted by Steven Lukes in *Power: A Radical View* (1974), which distinguishes between three 'faces' or 'dimensions' of power. In practice, a perfectly acceptable, if broad, definition of power can encompass all its various manifestations: if A gets B to do something A wants but which B would not have chosen to do, power is being exercised. In other words, power is the ability to get someone to do what they would not otherwise have done. Lukes's distinctions are nevertheless of value in drawing attention to how power is exercised in the real world, to the various ways in which A can influence B's behaviour. In this light, power can be said to have three faces. First, it can involve the ability to influence the making of decisions; second, it may be reflected in the capacity to shape the political agenda and thus prevent decisions being made; and third, it may take the

form of controlling people's thoughts by the manipulation of their perceptions and preferences. All politics is about power. The practice of politics is often portrayed as little more than the exercise of power, and the academic subject as, in essence, the study of power. Without doubt, students of politics are students of power: they seek to know who has it, how it is used and on what basis it is exercised. Such concerns are particularly apparent in deep and recurrent disagreements about the distribution of power within modern society. Is power distributed widely and evenly dispersed, or is it concentrated in the hands of the few, a 'power elite' or 'ruling class'? Is power essentially benign, enabling people to achieve their collective goals, or is it a form of oppression or domination? Such questions are, however, bedevilled by the difficult task of defining power. Perhaps because power is so central to the understanding of politics, fierce controversy has surrounded its meaning. Some have gone as far as to suggest that there is no single, agreed concept of power but rather a number of competing concepts or theories.

Further readings

1. An Introduction to Political Theory by O.P. Gauba, MacMillan Publishers India, 5th edition
2. Political Theory An introduction Edt. By Rajeev Bhargava. Ashok Acharya, Pearson publication-2009.
3. Political Theory, The foundations of Twentieth Century Political Thought by Arnold Brechet, Surjeet Publications New Dehli.-2008.
4. Political Theory ideas and Concepts by Sushila Ramaswamy Macmillan Publishers New Dehli-2004. Political Theory by Eddy Asirvatham published by S. Chand, New Dehli
5. Political Theory by Andrew Heywood, Palgrave Macmillan Third Edition, 2004.

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